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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Petitioner/Appellee

Case No. 20050591-SC

v.
NOE RODRIGUEZ CARRENO,
Respondent/Appellant

BRIEF OF PETITIONER STATE OF UTAH
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This Court granted certiorari to review the Utah Court of Appeals' decision in State
v. Carreno, 2005 UT App 208,113 P.3d 1004 (addendum A), which reversed and remanded
Carreno's convictions for attempted aggravated murder, aggravated burglary, aggravated
kidnapping, and interrupting a communication device. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant
to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(3)(a) (Supp. 2001) & § 78-21-4 (West 2004).
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Issue I: Did the court of appeals fail to properly apply the plain error standard in
reviewing the expense limitation issue?

Standard of Review: On certiorari review, this Court reviews the decision of the
court of appeals, not the trial court, for correctness and without deference to its conclusions
of law. State v. James, 2000 UT 80, \ 8,13 P.3d 576 (citations omitted). "The correctness
of the court of appeals' decision turns on whether that court accurately reviewed the trial
court's decision under the appropriate standard of review." Id.
Issue II: Did the Court of Appeals err in finding that the district court erred in
imposing a $500.00 limitation on the appointment of an investigator?
Standard of Review: Same as above.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The following relevant statutes and rules are set forth in full in addendum B:
Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-301 (West 2004)
Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-305.5 (West 2004)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with attempted aggravated murder (two counts), aggravated
burglary, aggravated kidnapping, and interrupting a communication device (R. 1-3).
Defendant, who is indigent, filed a motion to appoint an investigator (R. 31-34). The
motion was denied (R. 37-39). Defendant later filed a second motion to appoint an
investigator (R. 64-72). A hearing was held at which defendant was advised that he could
hire an investigator at a total cost of up to $500.00 (R. 75).1

1

On appeal, defendant stated that "After the State's Attorney agreed to stipulate to
appointment of an investigator, provided that not more than Five Hundred Dollars
2

Defendant was convicted of one count of attempted aggravated murder, aggravated
burglary, aggravated kidnapping, and interrupting a communication device (R. 96-99,17172, & T. 213). He was sentenced to five years to life on each of the first degree felonies and
to 6 months on the class B misdemeanor. The prison terms were to be served concurrently
(R. 177-79, 181-82 & ST. 6-7).2
Defendant filed a pro se notice of appeal (R. 187). The appeal was dismissed for lack
of jurisdiction because the notice of appeal was untimely (R. 255-6). Defendant then filed
a petition for post-conviction relief. Following a hearing, the district court resentenced

($500.00) would be expended the Court granted the motion." See Br. of App. at 7. But
nothing in the record supports defendant's statement concerning the State's Attorney. In
fact, the prosecutor filed an objection to appointment of an investigator, that made no
mention of a $500 limit (R. 43-47). Since defendant failed to include the transcript of the
hearing on the motion to appoint investigator, what the prosecutor may have said or
stipulated to at the hearing is not part of the record on appeal. In addition, defendant
added a footnote in his brief stating "Apparently the court's decision was driven by the
State attorney's agreement to appoint, but only with a limitation of the amount to be
expended. See Minute Entry of February 27, 2001. " See Br. App. at 11, n. 2. However,
a review of the February 27, 2001 minute entry does not support defendant's assumption.
The minute entry states:
"The defense may hire an investigator at a total cost of up to $500.
The States offer is communicated to the defendant and is not accepted. The offer will be
reduced to writing and provided to the defense." R. 76 (addendum C).
It is likely that the minute entry refers to the State making a settlement offer to the
defendant that the defendant refused, and that the State's settlement offer had no
relationship to the $500 limit for a defense investigator allowed by the court.
2

Although the transcript of trial and sentencing were filed in the appellate court,
they do not have Bates stamp numbers on them. Therefore, references to the trial
transcript will be cited as (T. page #). References to the sentencing transcript will be
cited as (ST. page #).
3

defendant nunc pro tunc (R. 325-28).3 He timely appealed to the court of appeals (R. 32930).
Without the benefit of oral argument, the court of appeals reversed the trial court in
a 2-ldecision. State v. Carreno, 2005 UT App 208, 113 P.3d 1004 (addendum A). The
court of appeals held that the trial court abused its discretion in limiting defense investigator
expenses to $500. Carreno, 2005 UT App. 208 at \ 10. The dissent points out that the
"main opinion adopts the following per se rule: If the trial court allows appointment of an
investigator and does anything to limit the amount of expenses allowed, the trial court has
automatically committed reversible error." Carreno, 2005 UT App 208 at \ 20 (dissent).
The dissent could find "no basis in the law for such a harsh and wasteful rule." Id.

3

The district court held a hearing with the county prosecutor and defendant's
appellate counsel (R. 324-26). At the conclusion of the hearing, the court made the
following ruling: "The court does not find any specific showing regarding the filing of the
appeal. In the interest of justice, the court finds the defendant should be allowed to be resentenced with the defendant's right to appeal within 30 days." (R. 325).
This ruling is incorrect, but unreviewable. The district court should not have
granted the petition without finding that the defendant had been unconstitutionally denied
his right to appeal. See Manning v. State, 2004 UT App 87, 89 P.3d 196, cert granted, 98
P.3d 1177, and see Manning v. State, 2005 UT 61,
P.3d
. The State has 1he right
to appeal the granting of a petition for post-conviction relief. See Utah Code Ann. § 7835a-l 10 (West 2004) and Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(o). However, the county prosecutor did
not file an appeal and the Office of the Attorney General was not aware that the petition
had been granted until the time for filing an appeal had passed.
4

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS4
The victim, Lee Duong, and his cousin, Abel Carrazco, were at Kristy Lamb's
apartment (T. 60-61, 77, 96-97). Lamb was defendant's wife, but they were separated (T.
76). Late at night, at midnight or one o'clock in the morning, they heard a knock on the
door (T. 60-61, 77). Lamb went to the door, looked out the peep-hole, and saw that it was
defendant (T. 78). She did not open the door (T. 78). Defendant started pounding on the
door, hitting it very hard, trying to force the door open (T. 62-63, 78). Lamb was leaning
against the door, trying to keep it closed (T. 78). Defendant broke or kicked the door open
and forced his way into the apartment (T. 62-64, 78, 98 ).5
When defendant entered the apartment he was holding a gun, pointing it at Lamb and
Duong (T. 63-64,79). Lamb began screaming and Duong was telling her to "call the cops."
(T. 64). Lamb ran over to the phone and tried to dial 9-1 -1, but defendant pulled the phone
jack out of the wall (T. 79).
Duong hit defendant in the face with his right hand (T. 65). He was going to follow
through with his left, but Lamb was trying to get in between the two of them (T. 65).

4

The facts are recited in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict. State v.
Casey, 2003 UT 33, f 2, 82 P.3d 1106.
5

In its recitation of the facts, the court of appeals majority opinion also includes
information about a prior incident where defendant's wife and the victim demanded
money from defendant, and assaulted and threatened him at knifepoint. The opinion
erroneously asserts that none of this information was adduced at trial. In fact, defendant
included information about the prior incident in his written statement which was admitted
as exhibit 9 at trial, and was provided to the jury (R. 132, T. 175-76).
5

Lamb was trying to grab the gun, trying to protect Duong from getting shot (T. 80-81).
Duong tried to push Lamb out of the way (T. 65). Duong then heard the gun fire and felt
a burning sensation on his arm (T. 66). The bullet went through Duong's arm, into his torso*
where it punctured his lung, and then lodged near his spine (T. 70,175). The doctors were
unable to remove the bullet and it is still lodged near Duong's spine (T. 70).
After being shot, Duong ran out the door of the apartment towards the building across
from Lamb's (T. 67). He knocked on the door, but no one answered (T. 67). Defendant
tried to pull Lamb out of her apartment (T. 81). When she got away from him, defendant
chased after Duong (T. 81). Duong saw defendant coming after him with the gun, so he
began running again (T. 67). Duong ran back toward Lamb's apartment, and as he ran, he
heard another gunshot (T. 68). He also heard defendant say in Spanish, "I'm going to kill
you." (T. 75). Duong ran back inside the apartment and out the back window (T. 68-69).
He ran towards the park, where he saw his cousin, Carrazco, and told him he was shot (T.
69). Carrazco had earlier run out the back of the apartment (T. 82, 99).
Defendant grabbed Lamb again and tried to get her to go home with him (T. 82). He
grabbed her shirt, pulltd her outside, and got her as far as the corner. Id. Lamb was yelling
for help. Id. She saw a friend of hers on the sidewalk and yelled at him to call the police
(T. 82, 116). At that point, defendant let go of her and ran towards the parking lot (T. 8283). Defendant drove away in a van (T. 83).

6

ARGUMENT
L

THE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO PROPERLY APPLY
THE PLAIN ERROR STANDARD IN REVIEWING THE
EXPENSE LIMITATION ISSUE.

The court of appeals addressed the issue of whether the trial court improperly limited
the expenses of an appointed investigator as if the issue had been properly raised. But
defendant failed to adequately brief the issue, failed to establish that the issue had been
preserved below, failed to argue plain error, failed to provide an adequate record for review,
and failed to establish prejudice.
This Court has granted certiorari review on the question of whether the court of
appeals failed to properly apply the plain error standard in reviewing the expense limitation
issue. The answer is clearly yes.
A.

The issue could only be reviewed as plain error
because defendant failed to preserve the issue,

"Rule 24(a)(5) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires appellants to
provide either 'citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial court'
or 'a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in the trial court.'
Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(5)(A)-(B)." State v. Finder, 2005 UT 15, \ 49, 114 P.3d 551.
Defendant did neither.
Defendant did not preserve the issue. The record on appeal does not reflect that
defendant objected to the $500 limitation in the district court. And on appeal, defendant
failed to include a transcript of the hearing on his motion for the appointment of an
7

investigator. Therefore, as the court of appeals acknowledged, "[t]here is no indication of
what position defense counsel took on the spending limitation." State v. Carreno, 2005 UT
App 208 at 1J4.
In his brief, defendant claimed that the "issue was preserved by the Petitioner's filing
of Notice of Appeal"

(Def.'s brief at 2). Filing a notice of appeal is not sufficient to

preserve an issue that was not properly preserved below. If it were, the preservation rule
would be meaningless. "As a general rule, claims not raised before the trial court may not
be raised on appeal." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74,111, 10 P.3d 346.
Nothing in the record demonstrates that defendant raised the issue of the $500 limit
in the trial court. "[I]n general, appellate courts will not consider an issue, including
constitutional arguments, raised for the first time on appeal unless the trial court committed
plain error or the case involves exceptional circumstances. State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, *f
13,95P.3d276.
Defendant failed to provide any statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue
not preserved in the trial court. When a defendant "does not argue that 'exceptional
circumstances' or 'plain error' justifies a review of the issue, we decline to consider it on
appeal." State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 n. 5 (Utah 1995).
Despite defendant's failure to preserve and failure to argue plain error or exceptional
circumstances, the court of appeals considered the issue. But the court of appeals did not
analyze the issue based on exceptional circumstances or plain error. The court of appeals

8

addressed the issue as if it had been properly preserved. This was error under State v.
Pledger.
B.

The court of appeals could not have found plain
error because any possible error was not obvious.

To demonstrate plain error, a defendant must establish that "(i) an error exists; (ii)
the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful." State
v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,1209 (Utah 1993). Even if the issue had been properly raised and
addressed under a plain error analysis, there was nothing plain about the purported error.
An error is plain or obvious if "the trial court should have been aware that an error
was being committed at the time." State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 122 n.ll (Utah 1989).
This requires that "the law governing the error [be] clear at the time the alleged error was
made." Dean, 2004 UT 63,116; see also State v. Eldredge, 113 P.2d 29,35-36 (Utah 1989)
(rejecting a claim of plain error where a dispositive appellate case had not yet been decided).
The court of appeals held that the trial court abused its discretion in limiting defense
investigator expenses to $500. Carreno, 2005 UT App. 208 at ^10. This is a new rule
which appears to contradict Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-305.5 (West 2004) (see argument II
below). It's axiomatic that an error cannot be obvious if the court must adopt a new rule of
law to find the error. In addition, there was no appellate law directly on point. "[A] trial
court's error is not plain where there is no settled appellate law to guide the trial court."
State v. Ross, 951 P.2d 236, 239 (Utah App. 1997); see also Eldredge, 113 P.2d at 35-36.

9

In addition, defendant failed to include a transcript of the hearing held on the motion
for an investigator as part of the record on appeal. Because the transcript was not included,
no record of what was said at the hearing was before the court of appeals. The court of
appeals therefore could not have known what the district court discussed, considered, or
focused on in deciding to grant the motion for an investigator. The court of appeals also
could not have known what the parties said about the $500 limit, or even why the district
court imposed a $500 limit.
Nevertheless, in its ruling, the court of appeals said that "in focusing on the expenses
of the investigator, rather than exclusively addressing the need for an investigator, the trial
court abused its discretion." Carreno, 2005 UT App 208 at ^f 10. The court of appeals
conclusion that the district court "focus [ed] on the expenses of the investigator'* is error
because there is nothing in the record to establish what the court "focused" on. Since
defendant failed to provide the transcript of the hearing, the appellate court should have
assumed that the trial court's decision was not erroneous.
When the record is not complete, an appellate court should "assume the regularity
of the proceedings below and affirm the judgment." State v. Blackwell, 809 P.2d 135, 138
n. 4 (Utah App. 1991) (quoting State v. Robbins, 709 P. 2d 771, 773 (Utah 1985)); see also
State v. Garza, 820 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah App. 1991); State v. Linden, 761 P.2d 1386, 1388
(Utah 1988); but see In re: General determination of rights to use of water v. Shepherd,
2005 UT App 450,ffi[12-18,

P.3d

(special concurrence).

10

The court of appeals could not have determined that there was plain error in limiting
investigator funds to $500 when it did not have a transcript of the hearing where the $500
limit was imposed, and any error was not obvious.
C.

The court of appeals could not have found plain
error because defendant failed to establish prejudice.

Plain error requires both obviousness and prejudice. State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63 at
^| 15. It was defendant's burden to establish that an error occurred and that the error was
prejudicial. As the dissent points out, "[e]ven if it could be said that the trial court
committed an obvious error in limiting the expenses for an investigator, we can only reverse
if the defendant demonstrates that the error was harmful." Carreno, 2005 UT App 208 at
Tf 19 (dissent); see also State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63 at ^ 22-23; and see e.g. State v. Cote,
27 Utah2d24,492 P.2d 986,987 (1972) (trial court's denial of the "defendant's application
for appointment of an investigator at public expense was not prejudicial to the rights of the
defendant."); United States v. Croft, 124 F.3d 1109, 1125 (9th Cir. 1997) ("Croft did not
show the lack of extra funds unduly hampered her defense or denied her effective assistance
of counsel"). Defendant failed to demonstrate that any error was prejudicial.
The Fifth Circuit found that the issue of whether it was error to arbitrarily set a
ceiling for investigation funds was premature where the money already granted was not yet
fully expended. State v. Wille, 496 So.2d 375 (La.App. 5 Cir. 1986), cert denied, 497 So.2d
301 (La. 1986). Similarly, the issue in this case was premature because defendant failed to
establish the $500 he was granted was inadequate or even expended.
11

In a Texas case, the record lacked evidence showing that the appellant had exhausted
the $500 allowed, or that he incurred expenses exceeding that amount. "Thus, the trial court
did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant's request for additional funds." Barney v.
State, 698 S.W.2d 114, 126 (Tex.Crim.App. 1985); see also Castillo v. State, 739 S.W.2d
280, 294-95 (Tex.Crim.App. 1987).
In an Arkansas case, the defendant argued that he should have been allowed more
than $200 to conduct investigation. Simmons v. State, 278 Ark. 305, 645 S.W. 2d 680
(1983). However, defendant failed to "show that the amount was inadequate or even
suggest any defense that might have been discovered." Id. at 686. Therefore the court
found no error. Id.
The record does not reflect that defendant in the case at issue objected to the $500
limit in the trial court below. He failed to include on appeal the transcript of the hearing
where the $500 limit was imposed. On appeal, he failed to present any argument that
imposing a $500 limit was plain error. See Br. App. at 10-12. In addition, he failed to argue
that he was harmed or prejudiced by the limitation. Id. In fact, he failed to even assert that
he spent the $500 he was given, let alone argue how he would have spent more. Id.
"Under the plain error doctrine, a defendant must not only demonstrate that the error
was obvious, but also that it was harmful or ' of such a magnitude that there is a reasonable
likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the defendant.5" State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63 at

12

TJ 22, quoting (State v. Evans, 2001 UT 22, ^ 16, 20 P.3d 888). Defendant not only failed
to meet this burden, he failed to even address it.
The court of appeals decision states: "We cannot say whether this was harmless error
because we could do no more than imagine what the investigator without the trial court's
severe limitation might have revealed." Carreno, 2005 UT App 208 at f 11. Of course, if
an appellate court "cannot say" whether an error is harmless, it cannot hold that the error
was harmful, one of the elements of plain error.
To demonstrate plain error, a defendant must establish that an error existed, the error
was obvious, and the error was harmful. "'If any one of these requirements is not met, plain
error is not established.'" Dean, 2004 UT 63 at If 15 (citing Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1209)
(citations omitted).
Plain error could not have been found because defendant failed to establish any of
the three requirements to demonstrate plain error.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING A $500 LIMIT ON THE
APPOINTMENT OF AN INVESTIGATOR.
Without benefit of adequate briefing or oral argument, the court of appeals reversed
a lower court decision based on a new rule, which appears to contradict Utah Code Ann. §
77-32-305.5 (West 2004) (addendum B). Defendant's conviction was reversed without the
State ever having a meaningful opportunity to address the issue on which the court reversed.

13

Even if the court of appeals could properly have reached the issue, the trial court did
not abuse its discretion by limiting investigator expenses to $500. The United States
Supreme Court has held that "a criminal trial is fundamentally unfair if the State proceeds
against an indigent defendant without making certain that he has access to the raw materials
integral to the building of an effective defense." Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77, 105
S.Ct. 1087, 1093 (1985). However, the U.S. Supreme Court does not require states to
"purchase for the indigent defendant all the assistance that his wealthier counterpart might
buy." Id. Rather, "fundamental fairness entitles indigent defendants to 'an adequate
opportunity to present their claims fairly within the adversary system.'" Id. (quoting Ross
v. Mqffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 612, 94 S.Ct. 2437, 2444 (1974).
On appeal, defendant did not allege that the $500 limit violated Ake, and the court
of appeals did not address or evaluate the $500 limit under the Ake provisions. In addition,
defendant failed to establish that the $500 limit denied him an adequate opportunity to
present his claims fairly.
Utah's statutory provisions meek the Ake standard. The current Utah statute
governing minimum standards for defense of an indigent defendant requires that an indigent
defendant be provided with "the investigatory resources necessary for a complete defense."
Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-301(3) (West 2004) (addendum B). In addition, Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-32-305.5 (West 2004), which was enacted and became effective in 1997, deals with
the reimbursement of extraordinary expenses, including the expense of investigators.

14

(1)

(2)

(3)

For the purposes of this section, an "extraordinary expense" means the
collective expense which exceeds $500 for any particular service or
item such as experts, investigators, surveys, or demonstrative
evidence.
The county or municipality shall reimburse expenses, exclusive of
overhead and extraordinary expense not approved by the court in
accordance with this chapter, reasonably incurred by assigned
attorneys for indigent defendants.
The assigned attorney shall file a motion with the court for approval
of the proposed expenditure for any extraordinary expense before the
expense is incurred. The motion shall be heard and ruled upon by a
judge other than the trial judge if so requested by either party or upon
the motion of the trial judge.

Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-305.5 (West 2004) (emphasis added) (addendum B).
Under the statute, the trial court here may have authorized $500 for an investigator
because it is the amount specified by § 77-32-305.5. If any attorney sought to spend more
than $500 for an investigator, it would be considered an "extraordinary expense" under §
77-32-305.5. The attorney would therefore have to file a motion with the court for the
approval of the proposed expenditure for an extraordinary expense (such as investigator
expenses which exceed $500) before the expense was incurred. Utah Code Ann. § 77-32305.5(3). The initial motion and memorandum to appoint investigator and the second or
supplemental motion filed by defendant do not request investigator expenses of over $500
and do not specify any reasons why an extraordinary expense of over $500 would be
necessary (R. 31-33 and 64-72).
There are currently no Utah cases which discuss or even mention Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-32-305.5. However, when courts are interpreting statutes, the primary goal is to
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"evince 'the true intent and purpose of the Legislature."5 State v. McKinnon, 2002 UT App
214, f6, 51 P.3d 729 (citing State v. Tooele County, 2002 UT 8, f 10, 44 P.3d 680). To
discern the legislature's intent, courts look first to the plain language of the statute. Id.
They do not look beyond the plain language unless the statute is ambiguous. Id.; see also
Coleman v. Thomas, 2000 UT 53, ^| 9,4 P.3d 783. In addition, courts seek to make all parts
of a statute relevant and meaningful, and avoid interpretations that render portions of a
statute superfluous or inoperative. Id. at n. 4; see also Tooele County, 2002 UT 8 at ^f 10.
Based on the plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-305.5, an expense for an
investigator which exceeds $500 would be an "extraordinary expense." To obtain approval
for an "extraordinary expense" an attorney must file a motion with the court for approval
of the proposed "extraordinary expense" before the expense is incurred.
Based on Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-301(3). and § 77-32-305.5, the district court judge
could reasonably have assumed that the $500 dollar limit was appropriate, unless the
defendant met the requirements of § 77-32-305.5 to establish that he was entitled to the
payment of an "extraordinary expense" over $500. Therefore, it was not error for the district
court to limit investigator expenses to $500.
Prior to the enactment of Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-305.5, the issue of investigative
expenses was governed by case law. That law provided that "[t]rial courts must determine
the circumstances under which an investigator is necessary for a complete defense, and trial
courts have some discretion in that determination." State v. Hancock, 874 P.2d 132, 135
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(Utah App), cert denied %S3 P.2d 1359 (1994). The Hancock court noted in a footnote that
a "trial court's determination of whether to appoint an investigator must always focus on the
facts of the case and never on the expense of such an appointment to the state." Id. at n. 3.
However, even this footnote did not state that a district court could never impose a dollar
amount limit for an investigator. It simply required that any such limit be determined by
reference to the facts of the case, not budgetary concerns. Obviously, the amount of
investigation needed will vary from case to case.
The only prior Utah case that discussed a court imposing a dollar amount for
investigators is Washington County v. Day, 22 Utah 2d 6, 447 P.2d 189 (Utah 1968). Day
made a motion to the court to provide him with an investigator. Washington County, 447
P.2d at 190. The court ordered that Day's counsel could employ an investigator "for a
period of not to exceed twenty days and at the pay of not to exceed $50 per day plus
necessary expenses." Id. On appeal, this Court held that "[wjhen counsel has once been
appointed, he can petition the county to appoint an investigator . . . Once an investigator is
appointed and renders services to the defendant and incurs expenses in his behalf, he is
entitled to be paid therefor by the county. He should file his claim with the county." Id. at
192.
Thirty-seven years ago, Washington County required a very different procedure than
is currently used, and is now required by statute. Previously, a defense attorney apparently
had to file his claim for investigator expenses directly with the county. But currently, a
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defense attorney must file a motion for appointment of an investigator with the court. See
Utah Code Ann. § 77-34-305.5(3) (West 2004); see also Hancock, 874 P.2d at 134.
Very few Utah cases have dealt with appointment or payment of an investigator. And
none deal with the specific issue in Carreno. See State v. Burns, 2000 UT 56, 4 P.3d 795
(county must provide investigatory facilities necessary for a complete defense to every
indigent person, not just to those represented by LDA); Hancock, 874 P.2d 132 (conditions
imposed before investigator would be appointed were reasonable); State v. Cote, 27 Utah
2d 24, 492 P.2d 986 (Utah 1972) (denial of appointment of an investigator was not
prejudicial where defendant did not contend that investigator would have assisted); Hatch
v. Weber County, 23 Utah 2d 144, 459 P.2d 436 (Utah 1969) (a county cannot avoid its
statutory duty because a claim was not filed in strict accordance with the statute).
Arizona has a statute similar to Utah's that provides that an indigent defendant
charged with a felony is entitled to "investigators and expert witnesses as are reasonably
necessary to adequately present a defense at trial." A.R.S. § 13-4013(B) (2005) (addendum
D). In State v. Murray, 184 Ariz. 9, 906 P.2d 542 (1995), the defendants, who were
brothers, were each convicted of two counts of first-degree murder and one count of armed
robbery7 and sentenced to death. Roger Murray requested funds for several experts. The
Arizona Supreme Court held that "'In order to find an abuse of discretion, we must
determine that the denial or restriction of investigative funds substantially prejudiced the
defendant.'" Murray, 184 Ariz, at 29-30, 906 P.2d at 562-63 (emphasis added), quoting
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State v. Claibourne, 142 Ariz. 335, 342, 690 P.2d 54, 61 (1984). The Arizona Supreme
Court held that Roger Murray "failed to show how he was prejudiced by the trial court's
refusal to allocate more than $3000 for investigators and experts." Id.
In the case at issue here, the majority opinion failed to mention prejudice, let alone
determine whether the restriction of investigator funds to $500 substantially prejudiced the
defendant. And defendant failed even to argue that he was prejudiced by the $500 limit.
The Court of Appeals erred by completely ignoring the fact that no prejudice had been
established.
In a death penalty case in Georgia, the defendant argued that the trial court erred by
granting him only $500 for an investigator. Roberts v. State, 252 Ga. 227,235,314 S.E. 2d
83, 92 (1984). However, the defendant made no subsequent requests for additional funds
and one of his trial attorneys confirmed that the defense had ample time to work with the
investigator and that he gave them all of the facts prior to trial. Id. at 230. Therefore, the
Georgia Supreme Court found no error. Id. Similarly, defendant in the case at issue
apparently made no request for additional funds beyond the $500 provided.
In Roberts, the trial court also said "If you need any additional funds, then we'll just
have to get back together . . . I'll approve $500, and we'll take a look at it if and when
you've spent that." Roberts, 314 S.E. 2d at 92. We don't know what else the trial court
might have said to defendant in the case at issue here because defendant failed to include
a copy of the transcript of the hearing on appeal.
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The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the trial court abused its discretion by
placing a $500 limit on investigator expenses. By ruling that the trial court abused its
discretion by placing a $500 dollar limit on the appointment of a defense investigator, the
court of appeals adopted a new rule, that appears to contradict Utah Code Ann. § 77-32305.5 (West 2004).
CONCLUSION
The court of appeals should have affirmed Carreno's convictions. Based on the facts
and arguments set forth above, the State respectfully requests that this Court reverse the
Court of Appeals decision.

RESPECTFULLY submitted this _ / _ day of November, 2005.
MARK SHURTLEFF
Attorney General

ERIN RILEY
Assistant Attorney General:
Counsel for Petitioner State of Utah
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abused its discretion. West's U.C.A. § 77-32-301(3)
Court of Appeals of Utah.
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Noe Rodriguez CARRENO, Defendant and
Appellant.
No. 20030927-CA.

[3] Costs €^>302.3
102k302.3 Most Cited Cases
Trial courts are required to appoint an investigator
for indigent defendants when necessary for a
complete defense. West's U.C.A. § 77-32-301(3).

May 5,2005.
Background: Defendant was convicted in the
District Court, First District, Brigham City
Department, Ben H. Hadfield, J., of attempted
aggravated murder, aggravated burglary, aggravated
kidnapping, and interrupting communication device.
He appealed.
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Jackson, J., held
that:
(1) trial court abused its discretion in limiting
expenses of appointed investigator for defendant to
$500, and
(2) appellate court would reverse and remand.
Reversed and remanded.
Bench, Associate P.J., dissented and filed opinion.
West Headnotes
[1] Costs €=>302.3
102k302.3 Most Cited Cases
Trial court abused its discretion in murder
prosecution in limiting expenses of appointed
investigator for defendant to $500; trial court
focused on expenses of investigator rather than
exclusively addressing defendant's need for
investigator. West's U.C.A. § 77-32-301(3).
[2] Criminal Law €^>1148
1 lOkl 148 Most Cited Cases
Appellate court will not reverse a trial court's
disposition of a motion for appointment of an
investigator absent a showing that the trial court

[4] Costs €^302.3
102k302.3 Most Cited Cases
Trial court's determination of whether to appoint an
investigator must always focus on the facts of the
case and never on the expense of such an
appointment; budgeting for such appointments is
the responsibility of city councils, county
commissions, and state legislatures, not trial courts.
West's U.C.A. §77-32-301(3).
[5] Costs €==>302.3
102k302.3 Most Cited Cases
In determining whether to appoint an
trial courts should consider only the
whether appointment of an investigator
for a complete defense. West's

investigator,
question of
is necessary
U.C.A. §

77-32-301(3).

[6] Criminal Law €=>H81.5(8)
1 lOkl 181.5(8) Most Cited Cases
Appellate court would reverse and remand after
concluding that trial court abused its discretion in
murder prosecution in limiting expenses of
appointed investigator for defendant to $500;
appellate court could not determine whether trial
court's error was harmless, as it could do no more
than imagine what investigator might have revealed
without trial court's severe limitation, and appellate
court could not conclude that error was invited, as
record did not indicate that defendant led trial court
into making error.
H004 Bernard L. Allen, Richards Caine & Allen,
Ogden, for Appellant.
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Riley, Assistant Attorney General, Salt Lake City,
for Appellee.
Before
Judges
JACKSON.

BILLINGS,

BENCH,

and

OPINION
JACKSON, Judge:
**1 Noe Rodriguez Carreno appeals his
convictions of attempted aggravated murder,
aggravated burglary, aggravated kidnapping, and
interrupting a communication device. See Utah
Code Ann. §§ 76-5-202, -6-203, -5- 302, -6-108
(1999 & Supp.2000). We reverse and remand.
*1005 BACKGROUND
**2 In its entirety, the record discloses the
following information: Carreno is a legal
immigrant dairy farmer who cared for his three
children while his wife abandoned the family in
favor of methamphetamine. In October 2000,
Kristy Lamb, Carreno's wife, returned to the home
accompanied by two men. She demanded money
from Carreno and became angry when he did not
provide her with a satisfactory amount. The two
men, Lee Duong and Gregorio Santos, assaulted
and threatened Carreno at knifepoint. Carreno
escaped unharmed, but Duong was arrested.
Carreno believed that Duong was dangerous and
involved in a gang. Thereafter, Carreno obtained a
protective order against Lamb and began to carry
his father-in-law's gun. None of this information
was adduced at trial.
**3 However, the trial record does extensively
detail another incident between Carreno and Lamb:
Late at night on November 26, 2000, Carreno went
to
Lamb's
apartment
carrying
the
gun.
Unbeknownst to Carreno, Lamb was with Duong
and another man, Able Carrazo. When Lamb did
not answer the door, Carreno kicked the door open.
A struggle ensued, and Duong punched Carreno.
The testimony conflicts as to how and when, but it
is clear that the phone was ripped out of the wall
and Duong was shot.

**4 Carreno was arrested, charged, and appointed
counsel. Several months before trial, Carreno filed
a motion to appoint an investigator. Initially, the
trial court denied Carreno's motion as lacking the
necessary information. Carreno then filed a
supplement to renew the motion. At the hearing on
the renewed motion, the prosecutor stipulated to the
appointment of an investigator, on the condition
that the investigator incur no more than $500 in
costs. There is no indication of what position
defense counsel took on the spending limitation.
Regardless, the trial court granted the motion with
the $500 limitation.
**5 In his motion to appoint an investigator,
Carreno indicated that he wanted to investigate
Duong and Lamb's drug and gang connections.
This information could establish (1) that Carreno
carried the gun only to protect himself from Lamb's
associates and the shooting was accidental and (2)
that Duong and Lamb's recollection and perception
of the events were compromised by their drug and
alcohol intake. Carreno also wanted the
investigator to study the layout of the apartment for
evidence that Carreno could not have been
responsible for the phone. He also wanted to
interview additional witnesses regarding the
inconsistencies in Lamb's, Duong's, and Carrazo's
statements and to probe the allegation that Carreno
fired a second shot and threatened Duong.
**6 A jury convicted Carreno of all of the charges;
Carreno now appeals.
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1][2] **7 Carreno asserts that the trial court
improperly limited the expenses of an appointed
investigator. "We will not reverse a trial court's
disposition of a motion for appointment of an
investigator absent a showing that the trial court
abused its discretion." State v. Hancock, 874 P.2d
132, 135 (Utah Ct.App. 1994).
ANALYSIS
**8 When society acts to deprive one of its
members of his life, liberty or property, it takes
its most awesome steps. No general respect for,
nor adherence to, the law as a whole can well be
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expected without judicial recognition of the
paramount need for prompt, eminently fair and
sober criminal law procedures. The methods we
employ in the enforcement of our criminal law
have aptly been called the measures by which the
quality of our civilization may be judged.
Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 449, 82
S.Ct.917,8L.Ed.2d21(1961).
[3] **9 Recognizing the paramount importance of
fairness in criminal trials, our legislature requires
that "[e]ach county, city, and town shall provide for
the defense of an indigent in criminal cases ... [by]
provid[ing] the investigatory resources necessary
for a complete defense." Utah Code Ann. §
77-32-301(3) (2003). "Trial courts are required to
appoint an investigator for *1006 indigent
defendants when necessary for a complete defense."
Hancock, 874 P.2d at 135. Yet, we have held that
trial courts may place some conditions on the
appointment of an investigator. See id. at 135-36.
In Hancock, we upheld a trial court decision that
required the defendant to pursue other available
means of investigation before appointing an
investigator. See id.
[4][5] **10 "The trial court's determination of
whether to appoint an investigator must always
focus on the facts of the case and never on the
expense of such an appointment.... Budgeting for
such appointments is the responsibility of city
councils,
county
commissions,
and
state
legislatures," not trial courts. Id. at 135 n. 3.
"[T]rial courts should consider only the question of
whether appointment of an investigator is necessary
for a complete defense." Id. (emphasis added). The
limit on expenditures is not an acceptable condition
on the appointment of an investigator because it
acts as a bar rather than a prerequisite. Thus, in
focusing on the expenses of the investigator, rather
than exclusively addressing the need for an
investigator, the trial court abused its discretion.
[6] **11 We cannot say whether this was harmless
error because we could do no more than imagine
what the investigator without the trial court's severe
limitation might have revealed. And, we cannot
conclude that this was invited error because the

record does not indicate that defense counsel lead
the trial court into making the error. See State v.
Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16, ffl 9, 12, 86 P.3d 742.
Accordingly, we must reverse and remand.
**12 "Although resolution of the above issue is
dispositive of the present case, where an appellate
court finds that it is necessary to remand a case for
further proceedings, it has the duty of 'pass[ing] on
matters which may then become material.' " Bair v.
Axiom Design, L.L.C., 2001 UT 20, % 22, 20 P.3d
388 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
**13 Accordingly, we address Carreno's additional
arguments. Carreno argues that a jury instruction
violated his right not to testify. The instruction at
issue advised the jury of a defendant's right to
testify or to choose not to; Carreno did not request
that the court give this instruction. The Utah
Supreme Court has previously held that it is not an
error to give such an instruction. See State v.
Nomeland, 581 P.2d 1010, 1011-12 (Utah 1978). In
fact, the supreme court characterized such an
instruction as "helpful" and "in no manner
prejudicial" to the defendant. Id. at 1012. Of
course, where the defendant does not request the
instruction, it would not be an error for the court to
not give the instruction. [FN1] That is, the
instruction is not required, if the defendant does not
request it.
FN1. Carreno also argues that another one
of the jury instructions impermissibly
emphasized the importance of majority
over
individual
conclusions.
This
argument, even if adequately briefed, lacks
merit and support. Also, because we are
remanding
for
further
consideration,
Carreno's
argument
regarding
the
defectiveness of the information can be
considered by the trial court, and if
necessary, the prosecution should be
afforded the opportunity to amend the
information. See State v. Strand, 674 P.2d
109, 111 (Utah 1983). At the same time,
our remand makes Carreno's ineffective
assistance of counsel claim moot.
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**14 We reverse and remand.
**15 I CONCUR:
Presiding Judge.

JUDITH

M.

BILLINGS,

BENCH, Associate Presiding Judge (dissenting):
**16 I respectfully dissent.
**17 The record does not reflect that Carreno
objected below to the $500 limitation on
investigator expenses. [FN2] Therefore, the only
way we can address the issue is to determine that
the trial court committed plain error or that
exceptional circumstances are present. See State v.
Dean, 2004 UT 63, J 13, 95 P.3d 276. On appeal,
Carreno does not make such an argument.
Nonetheless, "[t]o demonstrate *1007 plain error, a
defendant must establish that '(i) an error exists; (ii)
the error should have been obvious to the trial
court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the
error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more
favorable outcome for the appellant.' " Id. at ^ 15
(quoting State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74,f 13, 10
P.3d 346).
FN2. Carreno also does not directly
challenge the $500 limitation in his
appellate brief. Though the majority
opinion focuses on the money limitation,
Carreno focuses on the assertion that the
trial court erred by denying his first motion
for an investigator. Even if the trial court
committed error by denying the first
motion, it was not prejudicial because the
trial court granted Carreno's subsequent
motion seven weeks prior to trial.
**18 We cannot determine if the trial court
committed an obvious error without an adequate
record. " 'When a defendant predicates error to this
[c]ourt, he has the duty and responsibility of
supporting such allegation by an adequate record.' "
State v. Linden, 761 P.2d 1386, 1388 (Utah 1988)
(quoting State v. Wulffenstein, 657 P.2d 289, 293
(Utah 1982)). The record, in this case, does not
include a transcript of the hearing held on Carreno's
motion for an investigator. "Although such hearing

was apparently held ..., defendant failed to provide
us with a transcript of that hearing." State v.
Blackwell, 809 P.2d 135, 138 n. 4 (Utah
Ct.App.1991). Without a copy of the transcript, we
cannot ascertain the trial court's reasoning for
setting the $500 limitation. Therefore, without
speculating, we cannot say that the trial court
"focus[ed] on the expenses of the investigator,
rather than exclusively addressing the need for an
investigator," as the majority opinion asserts.
"Because defendant failed to provide such a record
to support his assertion ..., [we] 'assume the
regularity of the proceedings below and affirm the
judgment.' " Id (quoting State v. Robbins, 709 P.2d
771, 773 (Utah 1985)); see also State v. Garza,
820 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah Ct.App.1991) (stating that
where the defendant failed to provide us with a
transcript from a motion to suppress hearing we
must assume that the trial court's decision was not
erroneous); Linden, 761 P.2d at 1388 ("Inasmuch
as defendant has failed to provide an adequate
record on appeal on this point, this [c]ourt presumes
regularity in the proceedings below.").
**19 Even if it could be said that the trial court
committed an obvious error in limiting the expenses
for an investigator, we can only reverse if the
defendant demonstrates that the error was harmful.
See Dean, 2004 UT 63 at K 22, 95 P.3d 276.
Carreno must therefore show specifically how he
was prejudiced by the trial court's ruling on his
request for an investigator. See, e.g., United States
v. Croft, 124 F.3d 1109, 1125 (9th Cir.1997) (
"Croft did not show the lack of extra funds unduly
hampered her defense or denied her effective
assistance
of
counsel
under
the
Sixth
Amendment."); State v. Cote, 27 Utah 2d 24, 492
P.2d 986, 987 (1972) ("The action of the trial court
denying the defendant's application for appointment
of an investigator at public expense was not
prejudicial to the rights of the defendant.").
Carreno, in his appellate brief, never indicates how
he would have utilized an unlimited budget for
investigation. We do not even know whether
Carreno used the $500 he was allotted. He has
done absolutely nothing to demonstrate how the
lack of funds prejudiced his defense. "If the error
was harmless, ... then a reversal is not in order."
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State v. Nichols, 2003 UT App 287, \ 48, 76 P.3d
1173 (quotations and citations omitted), cert,
denied, 84 P.3d 239 (Utah 2003).
**20 Rather than applying the traditional rules of
appellate practice, the main opinion adopts the
following per se rule: If the trial court allows
appointment of an investigator and does anything to
limit the amount of expenses allowed, the trial court
has automatically committed reversible error. I
dissent because I can find no basis in the law for
such a harsh and wasteful rule.
113 P.3d 1004, 525 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 2005 UT
App 208
END OF DOCUMENT
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U.C.A. 1953 § 77-32-301

c
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 77. Utah Code of Criminal Procedure
*S Chapter 32. Indigent Defense Act (Refs & Annos)
*I Part 3. Counsel for Indigents
-•§ 77-32-301. Minimum standards for defense of an indigent
Each county, city, and town shall provide for the defense of an indigent in
criminal cases in the courts and various administrative bodies of the state in
accordance with the following minimum standards:
(1) provide counsel for each indigent who faces the substantial probability of the
deprivation of the indigent's liberty;
(2) afford timely representation by competent legal counsel;
(3) provide the investigatory resources necessary for a complete defense;
(4) assure undivided loyalty of defense counsel to the client;
(5) proceed with a first appeal of right; and

(6) prosecute other remedies before or after a conviction, considered by defense
counsel to be in the interest of justice except for other and subsequent
discretionary appeals or discretionary writ proceedings.
Laws 1980, c. 15, § 2; Laws 1981, c. 67, § 1; Laws 1983, c. 52, § 1; Laws 1995,
c. 166, § 6, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1997, c. 354, § 5, eff. July 1, 1997.
Codifications C. 1953, § 77-32-1.
U.C.A. 1953 § 77-32-301, UT ST § 77-32-301

Current through end of 2005 First Special Session
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U.C.A. 1953 § 77-32-305.5

c
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 77. Utah Code of Criminal Procedure
*I Chapter 32. Indigent Defense Act (Refs & Annos)
*I Part 3. Counsel for Indigents
•4§ 77-32-305.5. Reimbursement of extraordinary expense
(1) For the purposes of this section, an "extraordinary expense" means the
collective expense which exceeds $500 for any particular service or item such as
experts, investigators, surveys, or demonstrative evidence.
(2) The county or municipality shall reimburse expenses, exclusive of overhead and
extraordinary expense not approved by the court in accordance with this chapter,
reasonably incurred by assigned attorneys for indigent defendants.
(3) The assigned attorney shall file a motion with the court for approval of the
proposed expenditure for any extraordinary expense before the expense is iicurred.
The motion shall be heard and ruled upon by a judge other than the trial judge if
so requested by either party or upon the motion of the trial judge.
Laws 1997, c. 307, § 4, eff. May 5, 1997.
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES
Renumbered from § 77-32-9 by the Office
Counsel to promote consistency in numbering.

of Legislative

Research

U.C.A. 1953 § 77-32-305.5, UT ST § 77-32-305.5

Current through end of 2005 First Special Session
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Addendum C

FIRST DISTRICT - Box Elder COURT
BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

REVIEW OF MOTIONS

vs.

Case No: 001100703 FS

NOE RODRIGUEZ CARRENO,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

BEN HADFIELD
Februarv 27. 20 01

PRESENT
Clerk:
shaunaw
Prosecutor: BARON, ROGER F.
Defendant
Interpreter: IRENE EINZINGER
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Language: SPANISH
Date of birth: April 25, 1969
Video
Tape Count: 10:25 AM
CHARGES
1. ATTEMPTED AGGRAVATED MURDER - 1st Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty
2. ATTEMPTED AGGRAVATED MURDER - 1st Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty
3. AGGRAVATED BURGLARY - 1st Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty
4. AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING - 1st Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty
5. DAMAGE OR INTERRUPT/ COMM DEVICE - Class B Misdemeanor
Plea: Not Guilty

Case No: 001100703
Date:
Feb 27, 2001
HEARING
THE DEFENSE MAY HIRE AN INVESTIGATOR AT A TOTAL COST OF UP TO
$500.
THE STATES OFFER IS COMMUNICATED TO THE DEFENDANT AND IS NOT
ACCEPTED. THE OFFER WILL BE REDUCED TO WRITING AND PROVIDED TO THE
DEFENSE.
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A.R.S. § 13-4013

C
Arizona Revised Statutes Annotated Currentness
Title 13. Criminal Code (Refs & Annos)
*! Chapter 38. Miscellaneous
1 Article 16. Costs, Fees, and Disposition of Fines and Forfeitures (Refs & Annos)
-•§ 13-4013. Counsel assigned in criminal proceeding or insanity hearings; investigators and expert
witnesses; compensation
A. If counsel is appointed by the court and represents the defendant in either a criminal proceeding or insanity
hearing, counsel shall be paid by the county in which the court presides, except that in those matters in which a
public defender is appointed, no compensation shall be paid by the county. Compensation for services rendered to
the defendant shall be in an amount that the court in its discretion deems reasonable, considering the services
performed.
B. If a person is charged with a felony offense the court may on its own initiative and shall on application of the
defendant and a showing that the defendant is financially unable to pay for such services appoint investigators and
expert witnesses as are reasonably necessary to adequately present a defense at trial and at any subsequent
proceeding.
C. Compensation for investigators and expert witnesses who are appointed pursuant to subsection B of this section
shall be at such rates as the county contracts for such services. If a necessary expert witness represents a discipline
or has a skill that is not then the subject of a county contract, the county may either promptly procure those services
pursuant to § 11- 254.01 or ask the court to establish a reasonable fee for that witness. If no investigator or expert
witness who is under contract with the county to provide services is available and the defendant is unable to obtain
such services at the county rate, the court shall establish a reasonable fee for the expert witness or investigator
providing the service.
CREDIT(S)
Formerly § 13-1673. Amended by Laws 1956, Ch. 9, § 1; Laws 1964, Ch. 43, § 3; Laws 1973, Ch. 138, § 9.
Renumbered as § 13-4013 by Laws 1977, Ch. 142, § 158, eff. Oct. 1, 1978; Laws 2005, Ch. 145, § 1.
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES
Source:
Pen.Code 1901, §858.
Pen.Code 1913, §968.
Laws 1927, Ch. 22, § 1.
Rev.Code 1928, § 5001.
Laws 1931, Ch. 71, § 1.
Code 1939, §44-905.
A.R.S. former § 13-1673.
Adopted from California, see West's Ann.Pen.Code § 987.
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The 1956 amendment added the former section heading which read:
"Fee of counsel assigned in criminal proceeding or insanity hearing."
The 1964 amendment inserted the clause "provided that in those matters where a public defender is appointed, no
compensation shall be paid by the county" in subsec. A.
The 1973 amendment added subsec. B.
The 2005 amendment by Ch. 145 rewrote the section, which had read:
"A. When counsel is appointed by the court and represents the defendant in either a criminal proceeding or insanity
hearing, he shall be paid by the county in which the court presides, provided that in those matters where a public
defender is appointed, no compensation shall be paid by the county. Compensation for such services rendered to
defendant shall be such amount as the court in its discretion deems reasonable, considering the services performed.
"B. When a person is charged with a capital offense the court may on its own initiative and shall upon application
of the defendant and a showing that the defendant is financially unable to pay for such services, appoint such
investigators and expert witnesses as are reasonably necessary adequately to present his defense at trial and at any
subsequent proceeding. Compensation for such investigators and expert witnesses shall be such amount as the'
court in its discretion deems reasonable and shall be paid by the county."
Reviser* s Notes:
2005 Note. Pursuant to authority of § 41-1304.02, "Counsel assigned in criminal proceeding or insanity hearings;
investigators and expert witnesses; compensation" was substituted for the previous section heading.
A. R. S. § 13-4013, AZ ST § 13-4013

Current through End of the Forty-Seventh Legislature, First Regular
Session (2005)
© 2005 Thomson/West
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